Rethinking Conflict in a Changing World

How competing policy traditions and interests influence views on sovereignty, diplomacy, and the use of force

By Omar SAMAD and Martin KOBLER April 20, 2026

As tensions in the Middle East-Gulf region continue to ripple across global markets, supply chains, security architectures and geopolitical alignments, several experts on Iran and the Mideast have recently made a compelling case for a pragmatic “middle ground.” Their call arrives at a moment of acute instability, one that piqued with the stalemated Ukraine war, then sharpened dramatically across the Mideast in the final quarter of 2023 with the October 7 assault and the ensuing calamity across Gaza (and now Lebanon), and finally, escalated sharply since June 2025 with joint attacks on Iran, which was met with unexpected retaliation and resilience. It is an argument worth engaging seriously, not because it offers solutions (which it should), but because it forces us to confront a harder truth: the world’s most dangerous flashpoints are being shaped less by raw power than by misread histories, cultural blind spots, and the recurring temptation of dominance that comes at a very high cost, and usually ends with low strategic return on investment. These and other high-order “civilizational” factors at play are impossible to ignore. 

History, anthropology, psychology, and sociology, among related disciplines, all teach the same recurring lesson: nations, societies and leaders rarely succeed when they mistake technological, financial, or military superiority for strategic wisdom or long term success. Some obvious examples are Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan. Over the past several years we have witnessed decision-making that alternates between overconfidence and denial—either an honest ignorance of the other side’s worldview or, worse, a deliberate disregard for it. When policymakers fail or ignore to understand the deep-seated mindsets, ideological commitments, and survival instincts that animate actors in a given geography or “civilizational” setting, they set the stage for precisely the self-fulfilling prophecies we now see unfolding.

The Cost-Benefit Ratio

Recent events have delivered this lesson at considerable cost. Deceptive conspiratorial tendencies in geopolitics can negatively influence deal making and transactional negotiations. Disruptive tactics, erratic signaling, and attempts at forced reordering have often produced the opposite of their intended effect—hardening positions, shrinking room for maneuver, and accelerating the very chaos they were meant to contain. They also have a tendency to realign regional and global blocs, alter coalition positions and empower key competitors.

Military prowess and technological superiority may drive the opening rounds of conflict or shape a temporary outcome (as seen in Iraq), but they do not, on their own, determine its lasting impact and longer term outcome. Leadership acumen and charisma, strength of faith and conviction, and the depth of sacrifice and determination matter just as much. We are re‑learning what wise bazaar‑level negotiators have always known: ingrained values, rooted principles, and raw survival instincts ultimately outweigh transactional, market-driven convenience—especially when that convenience is detached from knowledge, experience, or cultural understanding.

There is, of course, a legitimate place for warfare within credible competition, in confronting genuine existential threats—not imagined or manufactured—like in self‑defense. But an over‑reliance on tech‑heavy military instruments, on forced reshaping or conquest driven by narrow profiteering, on unwarranted subjugation or punitive bullying, and on strategies devoid of political vision or moral and intellectual grounding, does more than fail. It destabilizes established orders, generates unintended chaos, fractures alliances, and redraws battlefields and dividing lines in ways that make future compromise, coexistence, and even basic transactioning far more difficult. Unless, of course, that is the implicit deliberate intent.

Clash of Concepts and Approaches

Contrary to what hegemonic powers often assume, the concepts of sovereignty and fairness—whether in trade, contracting, or any other arena—remain the non‑negotiable currencies for many actors–state or non-state–in the international system. Influence, manipulation, and lobbying may maximize profits for a handful of established powers, but there must still be space to address injustice and abuse. Relations and transactions yield better outcomes when reciprocity and mutual benefit are part of the equation. The alternative is a world permanently divided between a small group of controllers at the top and a large, resentful, uncertain majority of the controlled below; between the haves and the have‑nots whose grievances deepen instability, mistrust, and the desire for revenge or repudiation. Trickle‑down stability has proven illusory. What is needed instead is a deliberate architecture of shared knowledge, equitable access to resources—some associate this to the school of Longtermism espoused by William MacAskill, Nick Bostrom and even Elon Musk, who promote abundance as part of advancement and post-scarcity societies—and credible mechanisms of justice and fair play.

And none of this is simply about words on paper or signatures from entities we assume represent the rest of humanity. It is about an imperfect rules‑based order that we all claim to accept in principle, yet we know, requires continuous improvement to reflect changing realities, priorities, needs, and aspirations. That improvement demands resisting overly ideologized labeling, politicized narratives, and the deception campaigns—especially through social media—that distort reality and prey on overstimulated minds.

The Analytical Divide

Across Western analytical and academic spaces, the spectrum of views on conflict management is wide. On one end are hawkish policy circles that argue for maximal pressure and coercive tools; on the other are institutions that emphasize preventive diplomacy, sovereignty, ownership and rules‑based mechanisms. This diversity is not a flaw — it reflects the ongoing struggle to define how power should be exercised in a world where miscalculation carries enormous costs.

On the right, groups such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) typically advance policies built around maximum pressure, pre‑emptive force, regime‑change strategies, and a general skepticism toward diplomatic avenues. Their arguments are framed through national‑security and counter‑terrorism lenses, often asserting that adversarial states respond only to strength and that delaying confrontation increases long‑term risks.

By contrast, middle and left‑leaning policy institutes place greater weight on sovereignty, diplomacy, and rules‑based order as the foundations of stability. For organizations like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the International Crisis Group, rules are not tools to be selectively applied but guardrails that prevent escalation or peacefully settle conflicts. Their analyses emphasize that durable stability comes from political dialogue, not from military deterrence or preemptive measures alone, and that undermining these principles risks cycles of confrontation and insecurity. For these institutions, sustainable peace requires inclusive political processes, credible mediation, and a commitment to negotiation before intervention. They also warn that intensifying great‑power competition is eroding the very norms that once constrained escalation.

The United Nations Gap

The United Nations and other postwar institutions, often criticized by the right for bureaucratic inertia, now operate in an environment where their mediating role is increasingly supplemented, and at times bypassed, by nimble middle powers and well‑connected intermediaries. Part of this shift stems from the structure of the Security Council itself, where the veto power of the five permanent members can block consensus and stall action. Moreover, the General Assembly has ceased to perform the function it once exercised—namely, stepping in to assume responsibility when the Security Council is paralyzed, as exemplified by the “Uniting for Peace” resolution 1950, and even authorizing peacekeeping forces during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

In this vacuum, states with multilayered diplomatic, economic, and lobbying networks have stepped forward to host talks more than before, carry messages, and broker understandings. Pakistan is doing so today in the Iran crisis, just as Norway, Switzerland, Türkiye, Qatar, and others — including China in the Afghan‑Pakistan context — have done in recent years. This trend is not inherently self‑serving; it reflects not only a multipolar landscape in which peacemaking cannot be monopolized by any single institution, it also underscores the deliberate efforts of some powers to weaken and ultimately dismantle the multilateral order embodied in the United Nations. Yet it also introduces new transaction costs and potential conflicts of interest that must be managed transparently if trust is to be built or preserved.

Mitigating The Price of War

None of this implies that accommodation equals surrender or that every grievance deserves equal weight. It simply reflects what nonpartisan analysts, practitioners, and independent thinkers have long understood: in a region where history runs deep and memory is long, the wiser path is the one that recognizes limits, respects sovereignty, and seeks incremental, reciprocal gains before the status quo enables blowback or open confrontation. Hubris has humbled far stronger actors than today’s protagonists. Escalation dressed up as resolve risks turning manageable friction into historic regret and costly misadventures. Some argue that such blunders or perceived setbacks ultimately benefit the war economy and a narrow circle of beneficiaries. Studies by academic and research institutes on the “cost of war” repeatedly underscore that reality (see sources below).

What the world does not need now is another round of performative confrontation prioritizing short - term gains over long term solutions. The world needs negotiators who have absorbed the costly lessons of recent years and are willing to engage in the unglamorous work of middle‑ground, resolution-oriented diplomacy. Whether the current moment still allows for such an opening remains uncertain. But those urging pragmatism have at least framed the right debate: not whether power matters, but whether wisdom can still temper it before the price becomes unbearable for everyone.

Martin KOBLER is former German Ambassador to Pakistan, Iraq and Egypt. He was Special Representative of the Secretary General to UNSMIL (Libya 2015-17), SRSG to MONUSCO (Congo 2013-15), SRSG UNAMI (Iraq 2011-13), Deputy SRSG UNAMA (Afghanistan 2010-2011), Director General for Culture and Communication (MFA 2007-10), Chief of Cabinet of Foreign Minister (2000-03). His latest book is “Worldquake - Europe’s Chance for New Radiance”, Europa Verlage, Oct. 2025. He is a member of Diplomats Without Borders.

Omar SAMAD is a former Afghan Ambassador to France and Canada, Government spokesperson, speechwriter and Senior Advisor. He has think-tank experiences (2012-now) as a Senior Fellow, South-Central Asia (Atlantic Council, USIP and New America). He is a facilitator and convener of dialogue processes. He contributes as a speaker and international media commentator and analyst. His writings include Springer’s academic series “The Great Power Competition” Vol. 4 (Lessons Learned in Afghanistan: America’s Longest War) and Vol. 6 (The Rise of China). He is a member of Diplomats Without Borders.

Sources:

1. The Case for a Diplomatic Strategy on Iran” — Suzanne Maloney (Brookings Institution) https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-case-for-a-diplomatic-strategy-on-iran/

2. Nick Bostrom — Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority (2013) - https://nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.pdf

3. Hilary Greaves & William MacAskill — The Case for Strong Longtermism (2021 draft) - https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Greaves-MacAskill-2021-The-Case-for-Strong-Longtermism-GPI-Working-Paper.pdf

4. The Only Way to Stop Iran Is to Show Strength” — Michael Doran (Hudson Institute) https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/only-way-stop-iran-show-strength 

5. “Iran’s Roads Not Taken: Tehran, Washington, and the Failures That Led to War” - Foreign Affairs — January/February 2026 -  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-roads-not-taken-nasr

6. Deterrence by Punishment: A Strategy to Prevent Iran’s Nuclear Breakout https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/07/10/deterrence-by-punishment/

7. “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers” https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/17/return-of-geopolitics-revenge-of-revisionist-powers-pub-55382

8. “ICG - Watch list 2026” https://www.crisisgroup.org/en/watch-list-2026-spring-edition 

9.  Costs of War Project (Brown University) - post-9/11 U.S. wars, estimating over $8 trillion in costs including future veteran care - Link: https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu

10. Kellogg Insight: Economic Price of War - A 2025 study of 135 wars (1946–2023) - Link: https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/the-economic-price-we-pay-for-war

11. Institute for Economics and Peace: Economic Consequences of War https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Consequences-of-War-on-US-Economy_0.pdf 

12. The Dangerous Paradox of A.I. Abundance | The New Yorker https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-financial-page/the-dangerous-paradox-of-ai-abundance

13. A World Where All Is Free? That's Elon Musk's Theory of ... https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/business/a-world-where-all-is-free-thats-elon-musks-theory-of-sustainable-abundance.html

14. Middle Powers and Global Order (2022) – Bruce Gilley & Douglas A. Irvin‑Erickson (eds.) - 

15. Brokering Peace: Emerging Middle Powers, Agency and Mediation” (2025) Buğra Süsler (UCL) & Chris Alden (LSE) Link: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/129988